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This paper considers the measurement of human capital. A generalized framework for
human capital accounting is developed. Under this framework, human capital variation
can play a much bigger role in explaining cross-country income diﬀerences than traditional
accounting exercises suggest. Moreover, in assessing the wealth and poverty of nations, the
existing conﬂict between regression and accounting evidence can be resolved.
To situate this paper, ﬁrst consider the literature’s standard methods and results, which
rely on assumptions about (1) the aggregate production function, mapping capital inputs
into output, and (2) the measurement of capital inputs. The traditional production function
is Cobb-Douglas. In a seminal paper, Mankiw et al. (1992) used average schooling duration
to measure human capital and showed its strong correlation with per-capita output (see
Figure 1). Overall, Mankiw et al.’s regression analysis found that physical and human
capital variation predicted 80% of the income variation across countries.
The interpretation of these regressions is not obvious however, given endogeneity con-
cerns (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 1997). To avoid regression’s inference challenges, more
recent research has emphasized accounting approaches, decomposing output directly into
its constituent inputs (see, e.g., the review by Caselli 2005). A key innovation also came
in measuring human capital stocks, where an economy’s workers were translated into "un-
skilled worker equivalents", summing up the country’s labor supply with workers weighted
by their wages relative to the unskilled (Hall and Jones 1999, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare
1997). This method harnesses the standard competitive market assumption where wages
represent marginal products and uses wage returns to inform the productivity gains from
human capital investments. With this approach, the variation in human capital across
countries appears modest, so that physical and human capital now predict only 30% of the
income variation across countries (see, e.g., Caselli 2005) — a quite diﬀerent conclusion than
regression suggested.
This paper reconsiders human capital measurement while maintaining neoclassical as-
sumptions. The analysis continues to use neoclassical mappings between inputs and outputs
and continues to assume that inputs are paid their marginal products. The main diﬀerence
comes through generalizing the human capital aggregator.
2The primary results and their intuition can be introduced brieﬂy as follows. Write a
general human capital aggregator as  = (1 2 ), where the arguments are the
human capital services provided by various subgroups of workers. Denote the standard
human capital calculation of unskilled worker equivalents as ˜ .T h e ﬁr s tr e s u l to ft h e
paper shows that any human capital aggregator that meets basic neoclassical assumptions
can be written in a general manner as (Lemma 1)
 = 1(1 2 ) ˜ 
where 1 is the marginal increase in total (i.e. collective) human capital services from an
additional unit of unskilled human capital services. This result is simple, general, and
intuitive. It says that, once we have used relative wages in an economy to convert workers
into equivalent units of unskilled labor ( ˜ ), we must still consider how the productivity of
an unskilled worker depends on the skills of other workers, an eﬀect encapsulated by the
term 1.
This result clariﬁes the potential limitations of standard human capital accounting, which
focuses on variation in ˜  across countries. Because the variation in ˜  is modest in practice,
human capital appears to explain very little.1 In revisiting that conclusion, one possibility
is that 1 varies substantially across countries. Traditional human capital accounting
assumes that 1 is constant, so that unskilled workers’ output is a perfect substitute for other
workers’ outputs. However, this assumption rules out two kinds of eﬀects. First, it rules out
the possibility that the marginal product of unskilled workers might be higher when they are
scarce (11  0). Second, it rules out that possibility that the marginal product of unskilled
workers might be higher when they work with skilled workers (16=1  0).2 In practice,
because rich countries are relatively abundant in skilled labor, 1 will tend to be higher in
rich than poor countries, amplifying human capital diﬀerences. This reasoning establishes
natural conditions under which traditional human capital accounting is downward biased,
providing only a lower bound on actual human capital diﬀerences across countries.
1For example, comparing the 90th and 10th percentile countries by per-capita income, the ratio of per-
capita income is 20 while the ratio of unskilled worker equivalents is only 2 (see, e.g., the review of Caselli
2005).
2For example, hospital orderlies might have higher real wages when scarce and when working with
doctors. Farmhands may have higher real wages when scarce and when directed by experts on fertizilation,
crop rotation, seed choice, irrigation, and market timing. Such scarcity and complementarity eﬀects are
natural features of neoclassical production theory. They are also found empirically in analyses of the wage
structure within countries (see, e.g., the review by Katz and Autor 1999).
3To estimate human capital stocks while incorporating these eﬀects, this paper further in-
troduces a “Generalized Division of Labor” (GDL) human capital aggregator, which features
a constant-returns-to-scale aggregation of skilled labor types
(2 3)
that combines with unskilled labor services with constant elasticity of substitution, .T h i s
approach has several useful properties. First, the GDL human capital stock can be cal-
culated without specifying (·), so that the human capital stock calculation is robust to a
wide variety of sub-aggregations of skilled workers. Second, GDL aggregation encompasses
traditional human capital accounting as a special case. Third, the human capital stock
calculation becomes log-linear in unskilled labor services and unskilled labor equivalents,
making it also amenable to linear regression approaches.
Using this aggregator, accounting estimates show that physical and human capital varia-
tion can fully explain the wealth and poverty of nations when  ≈ 16. Meanwhile, regression
estimates suggest values for  in a similar range. This approach can thus resolve the conﬂict
between regression and accounting evidence in the existing literature. This consistency
appears both in the capacity to estimate central roles for human capital and in speciﬁc
estimates of  in the generalized aggregator. Moreover, while these calculations are made
across countries, existing micro-estimates within countries for related sub-classes of human
capital aggregators appear broadly consistent with values of  in this range (e.g., Katz and
Autor 1999, Ciccone and Peri 2005, Caselli and Coleman 2006).
Having established these results about human capital stocks, sources of human capi-
tal variation are further investigated by unpacking the skilled aggregator, (·).F i r s t ,
skill diﬀerences across countries are examined along quantity and quality dimensions. To
perform this analysis, it is shown that diﬀerences in the quality of skilled workers across
economies will tend to appear through diﬀerences in labor supply (quantities), not wages
(factor prices), providing a further caveat against relying on wage returns alone to make
human capital inferences. Second, it is shown - always maintaining neoclassical assumptions
- that quality diﬀerences between skilled workers in rich and poor countries can be naturally
ampliﬁed by labor division. Moving beyond the traditional treatment of skilled workers as
perfect substitutes, this analysis instead acknowledges that technicians, engineers, medical
4professionals, et cetera come in many varieties with highly diﬀerentiated task specializa-
tions. Such task diﬀerentiation may be inevitable in advanced economies where the set
of advanced knowledge used in production is too large for any one person to know (Jones
2009). This analysis supports the human capital stock calculations by showing in greater
detail where human capital diﬀerences across countries may come from.
Lastly, the paper discusses the broader meaning of a “human capital” explanation for the
wealth and poverty of nations. A human capital explanation acts to eliminate total factor
productivity residuals in explaining economic prosperity, which can be construed as a central
goal of macroeconomic research. At the same time, because residual productivity diﬀerences
are often interpreted as variation in "ideas" or "institutions", a human capital explanation
might be interpreted as limiting these other stories. I will argue, to the contrary, that the
embodiment of ideas (facts, theories, methods) into people is a good description of what
human capital actually is. Further, this process of human capital investment can be critically
inﬂuenced by institutions. In this interpretation, the contribution of this paper is not in
reducing the roles of ideas or institutions, but in showing how the role of human capital
can be substantially ampliﬁed, making it a central vessel for understanding productivity
diﬀerences.
Section 2 of this paper develops the generalized framework for calculating human cap-
ital stocks. Section 3 considers empirical estimates using both accounting and regression
approaches. Section 4 shows how human capital stocks can be unpacked along quality and
quantity dimensions and through the division of labor. Section 5 summarizes the results
and provides further interpretation.
Related Literature In addition to the literature discussed above, this paper is most
closely related to Caselli and Coleman (2006) and Jones (2010). Caselli and Coleman sepa-
rately estimate residual productivities for high and low skilled workers across countries when
allowing for imperfect substitutability between two worker classes. Their estimates continue
to use perfect-substitute based reasoning in interpreting a small role for human capital.
Jones (2010) provides a model to understand endogenous diﬀerences across countries in the
quality and quantity of skilled workers and shows that human capital diﬀerences expand.
These papers will be further discussed below.
52 A Generalized Human Capital Stock
Standard neoclassical accounting couples assumptions about aggregation with the assump-
tion that factors are paid their marginal products. The general framework builds from the
following assumptions, which will be maintained throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 (Aggregation) Let there be an aggregate production function
 = () (1)
where  is value-added output,  = (1 2) is aggregate human capital,  =
(1 2 ) is aggregate physical capital and  is a scalar. Human capital services
of type  ∈ {1} are  = , where workers of mass  provide service ﬂow .L e t
all aggregators be constant returns to scale in their capital inputs and twice-diﬀerentiable,
increasing, and concave in each input.
Assumption 2 (Marginal Products) Let factors be paid their marginal products. The




where  is the price of capital input  and the aggregate price index is taken as numeraire.
The objective of accounting is to compare two economies and assess the relative roles of
variation in , ,a n d in explaining variation in  .
2.1 Human Capital Measurement: Challenges
The basic challenge in accounting for human capital is as follows. From a production point
of view, we would like to measure a type of human capital as an amount of labor,  (e.g.,
the quantity of college-educated workers), weighted by the ﬂow of services, , such labor
provides, so that  = . The basic challenge of human capital accounting is that, while
we may observe the quantity of each labor type, {1 2}, we do not easily observe
their service ﬂows, {1 2 }.
The value of the marginal products assumption, Assumption 2, is that we might infer
these qualities from something else we observe - namely, the wage vector, {1 2}.





where  is the wage of labor type .3 It is apparent that the wage alone does not tell us
the labor quality, , but rather also depends on (),w h i c hi st h ep r i c eo f.









which, together with the constant-returns-to-scale property (Assumption 1), allows us to
















Thus, if wages and labor allocations are observed, one could infer the human capital in-
puts save for two challenges. First, we do not observe the ratios of marginal products,
{121}. Second, we do not know 1. To make further progress, additional
assumptions are needed. The following analysis ﬁrst considers the particular assumptions
that development accounting makes (often implicitly) to solve these measurement chal-
lenges. The analysis will then show how to relax those additional assumptions, providing
a generalized approach to human capital accounting that leads to diﬀerent conclusions.
2.2 Traditional Development Accounting
In development accounting, the goal is to compare diﬀerent countries at a point in time
and decompose the sources of income diﬀerences into physical capital, human capital, and
any residual, total factor productivity. The literature (e.g., see the reviews of Caselli 2005
and Hsieh and Klenow 2010) focuses on Cobb-Douglas aggregation,  =  ()
1−,
where  is the physical capital share of income,  is a scalar aggregate capital stock, and
 = (1 2) is a scalar human capital aggregate.
In practice, the labor types  =1  are grouped according to educational duration in
development accounting, with possible additional classiﬁcations based on work experience
3Recall that the wage is the marginal product of labor, not of human capital; i.e.  = 
 .T h i s
calculation assumes that we have deﬁned the workers of type  to provide identical labor services, .M o r e
generally, the same expression will follow if we consider workers of type  to encompass various subclasses
of workers with diﬀerent capacities. In that case, the interpretation is that  i st h em e a nw a g eo ft h e s e
workers and  is the mean ﬂow of services () from these workers.
7or other worker characteristics. Human capital is then traditionally calculated based on
unskilled labor equivalents.




1,w h e r el a b o rc l a s s =1
represents the uneducated.
This calculation translates each worker type into an equivalent mass of unskilled work-
ers, weighting each type by their relative wages. This construct is often referred to as an
"eﬃciency units" or "macro-Mincer" measure, the latter acknowledging that relative wage
structures within countries empirically follow a Mincerian log-linear relationship.
Calculations of human capital stocks based exclusively on unskilled labor equivalents
can be justiﬁed as follows.
Assumption 3 Let the human capital aggregator be ˜  =
P
=1 .
Note that this aggregator assumes an inﬁnite elasticity of substitution between human
capital types. This perfect substitutes assumption implies that  =  for any two types
of human capital. It then follows directly that the human capital aggregate can be written
˜  = 1˜ 1
Thus, as a matter of measurement, the perfect substitutes assumption solves the problem
that we do not observe the marginal product ratios {121} in the generic
aggregator (4) by assuming each ratio is 1.
To solve the additional problem that we do not know 1, one must then make some
assumption about how the quality of such uneducated workers varies across countries. Let
the two countries we wish to compare be denoted by the superscripts  (for "rich") and 
(for "poor"). One common way to proceed is as follows.
Assumption 4 Let 
1 = 
1 .
This assumption may seem plausible to the extent that the unskilled, who have no







8providing one solution to the human capital measurement challenge and allowing com-
parisons of human capital across countries based on observable wage and labor allocation
vectors.
2.3 Relaxing the Perfect Substitutes Assumption
To see the implications of Assumption 3 for the conclusions of development accounting, we
now return to a generic human capital aggregator  = (1 2).
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, any human capital aggregator can be written  =
1(1 2) ˜ .
All proofs are presented in the appendix.
This result gives us a general, simple statement about the relationship between a broad
class of possible human capital aggregators and the "eﬃciency units" aggregator typically
used in the literature. By writing this result as






we see that human capital can be assessed through three essential objects. First, there




1,w h i c h
translates diﬀerent types of labor into a common type - equivalent units of unskilled labor.
Second, there is the quality of the unskilled labor itself, 1. Third, there is the marginal
product of unskilled labor services, 1.T h e l a s t o b j e c t , 1, may be thought of generically
as capturing eﬀects related to the division of labor, where diﬀerent worker classes produces
diﬀerent services. It incorporates the scarcity of unskilled labor services and complementar-
ities between unskilled and skilled labor services, eﬀects that are eliminated by assumption
in the perfect substitutes framework. Therefore, the traditional human capital aggregator
˜  is not in general equivalent to the human capital stock , and the importance of this
discrepancy will depend on the extent to which 1 varies across economies.
Deﬁnition 2 Deﬁne Λ =
³

˜  ˜ 
´
as the ratio of true human capital diﬀerences to the
traditional calculation of human capital diﬀerences.4
4Note that, for any production function  = (),t h et e r m is constant given  and .
Therefore we equivalently have Λ =( ˜  ˜ )(), which is the extent total factor productivity
diﬀerences are overstated across countries.





indicating the bias induced by the eﬃciency units approach.
This bias may be substantial. Moreover, there is reason to think that Λ ≥ 1; i.e., that
the perfect-substitutes assumption will lead to a systematic understatement of true human
capital diﬀerences. To see this, note that 1 is likely to be substantially larger in a rich
country than a poor country, for two reasons. First, rich countries have substantially fewer
unskilled workers, a scarcity that will tend to drive up the marginal product of unskilled
human capital (11  0). Second, rich countries have substantially more highly educated
workers, which will tend to increase the productivity of the unskilled workers to the extent
that highly skilled workers have some complementarity with low skilled workers (16=1  0).
It will follow under fairly mild conditions that Λ ≥ 1. O n es e to fc o n d i t i o n si sa sf o l l o w s .
Lemma 2 Consider the class of human capital aggregators  = (1(2)) with




Thus, under fairly broad conditions, traditional human capital estimation provides only
a lower bound on human capital diﬀerences across economies.
2.3.1 A Generalized Estimation Strategy
In practice, the extent to which human capital diﬀerences may be understated depends on
the human capital aggregator employed as an alternative to the eﬃciency units speciﬁca-
tion. Here we develop an alternative that (i) can be easily estimated and (ii) nests many
approaches, as follows.
Lemma 3 Consider the class of human capital aggregators  = (1(2)).
If such an aggregator can be inverted to write (2)=(1), then the human
capital stock can be estimated solely from information about 1, ˜ , and production function
parameters.
This result suggests that there may be a broad class of aggregators that are relatively
easy to estimate, with the property that the aggregation of skilled labor, (2 3),
10need not be measured directly. Moreover, any aggregator that meets the conditions of this
Lemma also meets the conditions of Lemma 2. Therefore, in comparison to traditional
human capital accounting, any such aggregator allows only greater human capital variation
across countries.
A ﬂexible aggregator that satisﬁe st h ea b o v ec o n d i t i o n si sa sf o l l o w s .












where  ∈ [0∞) is the elasticity of substitution between unskilled human capital, 1,a n d
an aggregation of all other human capital types, (2 3).
This aggregator encompasses, as special cases: (i) the traditional eﬃciency-units aggre-
gator ˜  =
P







, and (iii) the Jones
(2010) and Caselli and Coleman (2006) speciﬁcations, which assume an eﬃciency units
aggregation for higher skill classes,  =
P
=2 . More generally, the GDL aggregator
encompasses any constant-returns-to-scale aggregation (2 3).I t i n c o r p o r a t e s
conceptually many possible types of labor division and interactions among skilled workers.
By Lemma 3, the aggregator (5) has the remarkably useful property that human capital
stocks can be estimated - identically - without specifying the form of (2 3).
Corollary 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, any human capital aggregator of the form (5) is






Therefore, the calculated human capital stock will be the same regardless of the underly-
ing structure of (2 3) — we do not need to know the potentially very complicated
and diﬃcult to estimate form that this skilled aggregator may take. Related, the understate-












11which can be estimated regardless of (2 3).5 The ﬁndings of the traditional
perfect substitutes approach are equivalent to the special case where  →∞ .6 This gen-
eralized division of labor approach will be examined empirically in Section 3. We will see
that, under reasonable parameterizations, it allows human capital to replace total factor
productivity residuals in explaining cross-country income variation.
2.4 Relaxing the Identical Unskilled Assumption
In comparing human capital across economies, analyses must also specify the relationship
between 
1 and 
1 . The often implicit assumption is that 
1 = 
1 (Assumption 4),
i.e. that the unskilled have the same innate skill in diﬀerent economies. Alternatively,
one might imagine that children in a rich country have initial advantages (including better
nutrition and/or other investments prior to starting school) that make 
1  
1 .7 On the
other hand, one might be concerned about selection. Those with little or no schooling are a
tiny part of the population in rich countries and a large part in poor countries. Especially in
the presence of compulsory schooling programs, the uneducated in a rich country may select
on substantial physical or cognitive diﬃculties, in which case we might imagine 
1  
1 .
Because human capital diﬀerences across countries track linearly in 
1 
1 (just as they
track linearly in 
1 
1 ) getting this ratio right may be important. This section considers






The basic challenge that motivated Assumption 4 is that we do not directly observe 
1
or 
1 . However, one can make potential headway by noting that immigration allows
us to observe unskilled workers from both a rich and poor country in the same economy.
Examining immigrants and native-born workers in the rich economy, one may observe the






























, because the 
1 and

1 terms cancel . Therefore, Λ is invariant to assumptions made regarding 
1 and 
1 ,a n d ,i np a r t i c -
ular, Assumption 4 is not relevant to this calculation.
6Equation (6) also implies that Assumption 3 is a strong version of the traditional accounting framework,
which is more generally equivalent to any aggregator written as ˜  = 1 + (2 3).I n o t h e r
words, the traditional calculation is correct should unskilled worker services be perfect substitutes for all
other worker services.


























1 are the wage and skill of uneducated immigrants working in the rich
country. In other words, immigration allows us to observe workers from diﬀerent places in
the same economy, thus allowing us to eliminate considerations of variation in ()1
across countries in trying to infer variation in 1.
If we proceed under the assumption that the unskilled immigrants are a random sample
of the unskilled in the poor country, then 
|
1 = 





1 ,a n d
















Of course, one might imagine that unskilled immigrants have higher or lower ability on
average than the unskilled who stay behind in the poor country. If immigration selects
on higher ability among the unskilled, then 
|
1  




provide a lower bound on the unskilled skill ratio, understating human capital diﬀerence
across countries.
3 Empirical Estimation
Given these theoretical results, we reconsider human capital’s role in explaining cross-
country income variation. We ﬁrst consider direct accounting and then consider regression
evidence. The analysis uses the ﬂexible, generalized division of labor aggregator (5) and
emphasizes comparison with the traditional special case.
3.1 Data and Basic Measures
To facilitate comparison with the existing literature, we use the same data sets and account-
ing methods in the review of Caselli (2005). Therefore any diﬀerences between the following
analysis and the traditional conclusions are driven only by human capital aggregation. Data
on income per worker and investment are taken from the Penn World Tables v6.1 (Heston et
al. 2002) and data on educational attainment is taken from Barro-Lee (2001). The physical
capital stock is calculated using the perpetual inventory method following Caselli (2005),
13and unskilled labor equivalents are calculated using data on the wage return to schooling.
These data methods are further described in the appendix.
Again following the standard literature, we will use Cobb-Douglas aggregation,  =
()1− and take the capital share as  =1 3.W r i t i n g  = 1− to account
for the component of income explained by measurable factor inputs, Caselli (2005) deﬁnes






where  i sa" r i c h "c o u n t r ya n d is a "poor" country. We will denote the success measure
for traditional accounting, based on ˜ ,a s.
3.2 Accounting Evidence
Table 1 summarizes some basic data. Comparing the richest and poorest countries in the
data (the USA and Congo-Kinshasa), the observed ratio of income per-worker is 91.T h e
capital ratio is larger, at 185, but the ratio of unskilled labor equivalents is much more
modest, at 17. Comparing the 85th to 15th percentile (Israel and Kenya) or the 75th to
25th percentile (S. Korea and India), we again see that the ratio of income and physical
capital stocks is much greater than the ratio of unskilled labor equivalents.
Using unskilled labor equivalents to measure human capital stock variation, it follows
that  = 45% comparing Korea and India,  = 25% comparing Israel and
Kenya, and  =9 %when comparing the USA to the Congo. These calculations sug-
gest that large residual productivity variation is needed to explain the wealth and poverty of
nations. These ﬁndings rely on unskilled labor equivalents, ˜ 
1 ˜ 
1 ,t om e a s u r eh u m a nc a p -
ital stock variation. Because unskilled labor equivalents vary little, human capital appears
to add little to explaining productivity diﬀerences.8
3.2.1 Relaxing the Perfect-Substitutes Assumption
The relationship between the traditional success measure and the success measure for a
general human capital aggregator is
 = Λ1− × 
8Figure A1 shows  when comparing all income percentiles from 70/30 (Malaysia/Honduras) to
99/1 (USA-Congo). The average measure of  is 31% over this sample.
14which follows from Lemma 1 and the deﬁnition of Λ.
One can implement a generalized accounting using the GDL aggregator. From (6) and
the data in Table 1, it is clear that Λ can be large. While the variation in unskilled labor
equivalents, ˜ 
1 ˜ 
1 , is modest, the human capital variation that corrects for labor division
expands according to two objects. One is the relative scarcity of unskilled labor services,

1 
1 . The second is the degree of complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor
services, as deﬁned by .
The literature on the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor within
c o u n t r i e ss u g g e s t st h a t ∈ [12].9 Table 2 (Panel A) reports the results of development
accounting over this range of , focusing on the Israel-Kenya example. The ﬁrst row
presents the human capital diﬀerences, , the second row presents the ratio of these
diﬀerences to the traditional calculation, Λ, and the third row presents the resulting
 measure for capital inputs in explaining cross-country income diﬀerences. As shown
in the table, factor-based explanations for income diﬀerences are substantially ampliﬁed by
allowing for labor division. As complementarities across workers increase, the need for TFP
residuals decline.10 For the Israel-Kenya example, the need for residual TFP diﬀerences is
eliminated at  =1 54, where human capital diﬀerences are  =1 0 5.
One can also consider a broader set of rich-poor comparisons; for example, all coun-
try comparisons from the 70/30 income percentile (Malaysia/Honduras) up to the 99/1
percentile (USA/Congo).11 Calculating the elasticity of substitution, , at which capital
inputs fully explain income diﬀerences, shows that the mean value is  =1 55 in this sample
with a standard deviation of 034. Notably, the estimated values of  typically fall in the
same [12] interval as the micro-literature suggests.
9See, e.g. reviews in Katz and Autor (1999) and Ciccone and Peri (2005). Most estimates come from
regression analyses that may be substantially biased due to the endogeneity of labor supply. Ciccone and
Peri (2005) use compulsory schooling laws as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in schooling across
U.S. states and ﬁnd that  is in a range between 13 and 2 depending on the speciﬁcation. All these
estimates consider the elasticity of substitution between high-school and college-educated workers, and they
may not extend to primary vs non-primary educated workers. The regression analysis below, however, also
suggests  in this range.
10The intuition for this result will be discussed in Section 4.
11The Malaysia/Honduras income ratio is 3.8. As income ratios (and capital measures) converge towards
1, estimates of  become noisier.
153.2.2 Relaxing the Identical Unskilled Assumption
Table 2 (Panel B) further relaxes Assumption 4, allowing 
1 
1 to be determined from
immigration data. Examining immigrants to the U.S. using the year 2000 U.S. Census, the
mean wages of employed unskilled workers varies modestly based on the source country (see
Figure A2). While the data are noisy, one may infer that mean wages are about 17% lower
for uneducated workers born in the U.S. compared to immigrants from the very poorest
countries, which suggests 
1 
1 ≈ 83 (see Appendix for details).12
Such an adjustment lowers the explanatory power of human capital in explaining cross-
country variation. The adjustment seems large - it cuts human capital diﬀerences by
17%. However, in practice, relaxing Assumption 4 has modest eﬀects compared to relaxing
Assumption 3, as seen in Table 2. Now residual TFP diﬀerences are eliminated when
 =1 50 for the Israel-Kenya comparison. Across the broader set of rich-poor examples,
additionally relaxing Assumption 4 leads to a mean value of  =1 58,w i t has t a n d a r d
deviation of 037.
The human capital stock estimations are summarized for the broader sample in Figure
2. The ratio of human stocks for each pair of countries from the 70/30 income percentile
to the 99/1 income percentile is presented. Panel A considers the generalized framework,
with  =1 6. Panel B considers traditional human capital accounting. We see that, as
reﬂected in Table 1, traditional human capital accounting admits very little human capital
variation. It appears orders of magnitude less than the variation in physical capital or
income. With the generalized framework, human capital diﬀerences substantially expand,
admitting variation similar in scale to the variation in income and physical capital.
3.3 Regression Evidence
Regression analysis in the development accounting context is controversial. While Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil (1992) ﬁnd a large 2 and theoretically credible relationships between
capital aggregates and output, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) point out the omitted
12This micro-data ﬁnding stands in contrast to the cross-country analysis of Manuelli and Seshadri (2005),
which relies on 
1  
1 . Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) can be understood as relaxing Assumption 4 but
not relaxing Assumption 3, which means that one will require 
1  
1 to increase the explanatory power
of human capital in a cross-country setting. The immigrant wage data is inconsistent with 
1  
1
unless one assumes that uneducated immigrants to the U.S. select on extremely high ability compared to
the non-immigrating population. More generally, Table 2 suggests that much more action comes from
relaxing Assumption 3.
16variable hazards in interpreting such regressions. In practice, because average schooling is
highly correlated with income per-capita, regressions of income on schooling variables will
tend to show highly signiﬁcant positive relationships and large 2. While this correlation
might be causative, it may well not be, and caution is needed.13
Given these concerns, the more telling aspect of regression analysis may come less from
high 2 and more from the implied production function parameters. In particular, it
is informative whether the estimated production function parameters are consistent with
the production functions being estimated in direct accounting exercises. This connection
explicitly fails in the traditional analyses: using a (quasi14) perfect substitutes aggregation
of human capital, Mankiw, Romer, Weil (1992) suggests that human capital plays a primary
role in cross-country income diﬀerences, but explicit accounting using a perfect substitutes
aggregation suggests the opposite conclusion.
In this section, we show that the generalized aggregator may avoid this conﬂict. Con-
tinuing with the standard Cobb-Douglas production function,  = ()1−,d e ﬁne
income net of physical capital’s contribution as log ˆ  =l o g  − log. The GDL ag-
gregator implies log ˆ  =( 1− )[log + 1
1− log1 + 
−1 log ˜ ]. A regression can then
estimate
log ˆ   = 0 + 1 log
1 + 2 log ˜  +  (8)
where  indexes countries. The values of  are then implied by the coeﬃcient estimates.15
3.3.1 Relaxing the Eﬃciency Units Assumption
Table 3 presents the regression results. Columns (1)-(3) examine (8) while maintaining
Assumption 4. Column (1) shows that the explanatory power of log ˜  is substantial. The
coeﬃcient implies  =1 34, with a 95% conﬁdence interval of [128134]. Column (2)
considers the explanatory power of log1, which is also substantial. The coeﬃcient implies
13An additional challenge for the original Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) approach is the linear use of
schooling duration for the human capital aggregator, i.e.  =

=1 ,w h e r e is the number of years
of school. This approach is an eﬃciency units aggregator (Assumption 3) combined with an additional
assumption equating skill to years in school, i.e.  = . However, this combination is inconsistent with
the wage evidence. Under Assumption 3, the relative skill  is linear in the relative wage, ,
which are log-linear in schooling duration, not linear. Thus the assumption that  =  does not appear
supportable with a neoclassical aggregator.
14See prior footnote.
15Regression estimates that attempt to account for both physical and human capital simultaneously
are much noisier, presumably due to the high correlation between these capital stocks and consequent
multicollinearity.
17 =1 70, with a 95% conﬁdence interval of [150217]. Considering log ˜  and log1
together, in column (3), the estimates of  rise somewhat and become noisier.
3.3.2 Relaxing the Identical Unskilled Assumption
Table 3 columns (4)-(6) further examine (8) while additionally relaxing Assumption 4. Im-
migrant wage outcomes are used to estimate variation in 
1 from the U.S. 2000 census, and
the measures for log ˜  and log
1 are then adjusted accordingly. (The methodology is
further detailed in the Appendix.) In column (4) the coeﬃcient on log ˜  now implies
 =1 64, with a 95% conﬁdence interval of [150187]. I nc o l u m n( 5 )t h ec o e ﬃcient on
log1 implies  =1 88, with a 95% conﬁdence interval of [164238]. Joint estimation
again raises the  estimates somewhat and expands the conﬁdence intervals. Many robust-
ness checks have also been considered, varying how ˜  and 1 are calculated, as further
discussed in the Appendix. In general, the regressions tend to point to estimates of  in
similar ranges.
Overall, we see broad consistency between (1) the range of  that eliminates TFP dif-
ferences in explicit accounting, (2) regression estimates of , and (3) within-country micro-
evidence on the substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor. These observations
suggest that the GDL aggregator may provide a reasonable theoretical approach, resolving
the tension between regression and accounting methodologies while implying that human
capital variation can now play a substantial role in explaining income variation across coun-
tries. These ﬁndings - both Table 2 and Table 3 - are robust to any constant-returns-to-scale
speciﬁcation of the aggregator (2 3).
4 Inside Human Capital Stocks
A value of the human capital stock calculations above is that they do not require detailed
speciﬁcation of the aggregator. At the same time, it would be useful to look "underneath
the hood" and gain a better understanding of where the variation in stocks may come from.
One basic question is whether the increased human capital services in rich countries follow
from the quantity and/or quality of skilled labor. It is clear (Figure 1), that the quantity of
skilled laborers is much greater in rich countries. It will be shown below that the quality of
skilled laborers also appears much greater in rich countries. An ensuing question is then how
18quality advantages in rich countries may emerge, and the greater acquisition of knowledge
by skilled workers will be oﬀered as a potential explanation. While empirical estimation
becomes increasingly challenging, given the lack of consensus (or knowledge) about produc-
tion functions at this level of detail, the theory provides a road-map for estimation, and
illustrative calibrations are oﬀered.
4.1 The Quality and Quantity of Labor Services
We begin with theoretical considerations for inferring labor quality. In general under










where  =  is the mean ﬂow of services from the workers in group .T h u s t h e r e l a t i v e
qualities () can in general be inferred from relative wages (), which are factor
prices, and the relative marginal products of the human capital intermediates (),
which are the relative prices of the human capital services.
Now consider a type of partial equilibrium experiment, where we hold the relative prices
() ﬁxed. In that case, increasing the skill ratio by a factor of  would increase
the wage ratio by the same factor. This provides standard intuition, for example, for the
common practice in economics of using wage returns to schooling variation to make claims
about variation in skill returns. Were we to extend such reasoning to comparisons between


















where the subscript "PE" indicates that we are using a type of partial equilibrium reasoning.
Of course, comparing economies with substantially diﬀerent factor allocations suggests
that partial equilibrium analysis could be problematic. In general equilibrium, we need to
introduce the possibility that relative prices ()v a r y . 16 This caution becomes more
precise by allowing for the labor allocation to shift in response to variations in skill returns.
16Ignoring such price variation in general equilibrium requires Assumption 3 — that diﬀerent skill classes
are perfect substitutes — so that  is a constant. However, as discussed above, perfect substitutability
across educational groups appears inconsistent with the empirical evidence (e.g., Katz and Autor 1999,
Ciccone and Peri 2005).
19To see this, consider a simple stylized theory with endogenous labor supply.17
Assumption 5 Let individual income, , as a function of educational duration, ,b e
()=
R ∞
 ()− where the discount rate  is ﬁxed. Let individuals be identical
ex-ante and maximize income with respect to educational duration.
Workers train for some period of years and then work, with choices over training duration
determining the supply of various worker classes. Deﬁning an elasticity of substitution
 = −
 ln()
 ln(), we establish the following result.
Lemma 4 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 5, (a)
 ln()
 ln() =0and (b)
 ln()
 ln() = −1.
This result provides exactly the opposite intuition from the partial equilibrium reasoning.
Namely, the lemma says that quality variation will appear through quantities, not through
wages. If labor supply is endogenous as in Assumption 5, then labor allocations shift to
neutralize the wage variation. Under the lemma, and comparing two countries with a


















With endogenous labor supply, quality variation becomes divorced from wage variation and
appears instead through the allocative shifts that the partial equilibrium reasoning ignored.
To further establish this general equilibrium intuition, and its empirical relevance, con-
sider the following observation (and see Figure 3 below). Skilled-unskilled wage ratios tend
to be fairly similar across economies, while skilled-unskilled labor supply ratios tend to be
extremely diﬀerent. That wage returns to education are fairly similar across economies fol-
lows naturally from result (a) of the lemma; when labor supply is endogenous, equilibrium
investment levels in education drive the rate of return to the local discount rate. How
then can a country like the United States sustain high wage returns to education despite a
massive increase in the quantity of highly-educated workers? Quality advantages provide
an answer. Expanded labor supply lowers the prices for skilled labor services. To maintain
such labor supply in equilibrium, one needs quality advantages.
17The educational choice decision follows Mincer’s original theoretical justiﬁcation for the log-linear wage-
schooling relationship (Mincer 1958). The assumption that  is ﬁxed could be relaxed. See also Jones
(2010).
20The lemma also makes this quantity-quality linkage explicit, via result (b). When the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor is greater than one, economies
with higher skilled quality will see greater skilled labor supply in response. Moreover, for a
given diﬀerence in labor quantity, the implied quality diﬀerences become increasingly large as
the elasticity of substitution falls toward one (because skilled output prices fall increasingly
quickly in response to skilled quantity increases, so that larger quality diﬀerences are required
to maintain the wage ratio). This theoretical reasoning explains why, in Table 2, human
capital’s capacity to explain cross-country income diﬀerences is increasing as the elasticity
of substitution falls.
4.1.1 Empirical Estimates of Quality Diﬀerences
Figure 3 presents the variation in wage returns and skilled labor supply when comparing rich
and poor countries. Deﬁning  as the mass of skilled workers and  as their mean wage,
the variation in wage returns is seen to be exceptionally modest, while the variation in labor
supply is enormous. Taking the Israel-Kenya example, the relative skilled labor allocation
(1)i s2300% greater in Israel, while the wage returns (1)a r eo n l y20% lower.
Taking the USA-Congo example, the relative skilled labor allocation is 17500% greater in
the USA, while the wage returns are only 15% lower. Consistent with Lemma 4, massive
increases in skilled labor supply can be reconciled with little if any drop in wage returns
through variation in the quality of skilled labor services.
To estimate the variation in the quality of skilled services, return ﬁrst to the human
capital stock calculations of Section 3. Using the GDL aggregator in tandem with (9), one


























where  = (2 3) is the mean ﬂow of services from skilled workers.
Table 4 (Panel A) reports the implied variation in 1, continuing with the rich-poor
example in Table 2. Recall that human capital stock variation eliminates residual total
factor productivity variation when  ≈ 16. At this value of , the relative service ﬂows
of skilled workers in the rich country appear 986 times larger than in the poor country.
This empirical ﬁnding is consistent with Caselli and Coleman (2006), but now explicitly
extended to the general class of skilled labor aggregators, (2 3). Thus similar
21wage returns are consistent with massive diﬀerences in labor allocation when skilled service
ﬂows are substantially higher in rich countries.
Skilled service ﬂows can be further articulated by specifying particular skilled aggrega-












where  is the elasticity of substitution among these types. Table 4 (Panel B) presents the
implied service ﬂows from these diﬀerent groups of skilled workers.18 Taking a range of
 ∈ [122], the implied skill return advantages for skilled but less than tertiary-educated
workers in the rich country are in the interval [69103], while the skill returns among the
tertiary-educated are in the interval [60284].
In sum, labor allocations and wage returns are reconciled when service ﬂows from higher
educated workers in rich countries are far higher (as a group) than their service ﬂows in
poor countries. The next section considers how the acquisition of knowledge may explain
this phenomenon.
4.2 Labor Division and the Acquisition of Knowledge
The analysis above, in dropping the perfect substitutes assumption, equivalently imagines
that individuals work on diﬀerentiated, interdependent tasks, so that the productivity of
unskilled workers depends on the broader human capital context in which they work. For
example, the output of dishwashers can now depend on the chef, the output of hospital
orderlies on the doctors, and the output of factory janitors on the engineers who design and
run the plant.
The GDL estimations also implicitly incorporate variation in the division of labor through
the skilled aggregator (). In advanced economies, and especially among the highly edu-
cated, skills can be highly diﬀerentiated. Not only do skills diﬀer between medical doctors,
chemical engineers, computer scientists, molecular biologists, lawyers, and architects, but
18The skill returns for the sub-groups of workers are calculated using the general result (9) in tandem



















The calculations in Panel B of Table 4 assume  =1 6 in the GDL aggregator; i.e. the value of  where
capital variation fully explains the income variation.
22skills within professions can be highly diﬀerentiated themselves. For example, there are
145 accredited medical specialities in the United States, and MIT oﬀers 119 courses across
8 sub-specialities within aeronautical engineering alone.19 By comparison, Uganda has 10
accredited medical specialties, and the engineering faculty of Mekerere University, often
rated as the top university in Sub-Saharan Africa outside South Africa, does not oﬀer any
aeronautics courses within its engineering curriculum.
This section considers greater task specialization among skilled workers as a possible
explanation for the greater skilled service ﬂows in rich countries. The approach incorporates
the classic idea that the division of labor may be a primary source of economic prosperity
(e.g., Smith 1776) and builds on ideas in a related paper (Jones 2010), which considers
micro-mechanisms that can obstruct collective specialization among skilled workers.
The core observation is that focused training and experience can provide extremely
large skill gains at speciﬁc tasks. For example, the willingness to pay a thoracic surgeon
to perform heart surgery is likely orders of magnitude larger than the willingness to pay a
dermatologist (or a Ph.D. economist!) to perform that task. Similarly, when building a
microprocessor fabrication plant, the service ﬂows from appropriate, specialized engineers
are likely orders of magnitude greater than could be achieved otherwise. Put another way,
if no individual can be an expert at everything, then embodying the stock of productive
knowledge in the workforce requires a division of labor. Possible limits to task specialization
include: (i) the extent of the market (e.g. Smith 1776); (ii) coordination costs across workers
(e.g. Becker and Murphy 1992); (iii) the extent of existing advanced knowledge (Jones 2009);
and (iv) local access to advanced knowledge (e.g. Jones 2010). Here we consider a simple
production theory to explore how variation in task specialization may explain variation in
skilled services across economies.20
4.2.1 Production with Specialized Skills
Consider skilled production as the performance of a wide range of tasks, indexed over a
unit interval. Production can draw on a group of  individuals. With  individuals, each
member of the group can focus on learning an interval 1 of the tasks. This specialization
19Accredited medical specialities are listed by the American Board of Medical Special-
ties, http://www.abms.org. The MIT subject oﬀerings are found in the MIT Bulletin,
http://web.mit.edu/catalog/.
20The following set-up is closest theoretically to Becker and Murphy (1992) and Jones (2010). It diﬀers
in part by providing a path toward calibration.
23allows the individual to focus her training on a smaller set of tasks, increasing her mastery
at this set of tasks. If an individual devotes a total of  units of time to learning, then the
time spent learning each task is .
Let the skill at each task be deﬁned by a function () where 0()  0. Meanwhile, let
there be a coordination penalty () for working in a team. Let task services aggregate with
a constant returns to scale production function that is symmetric in its inputs, so that the
per-capita output of a team of skilled workers with breadth 1 will be ()=()().
We assume that 0()  0, so that bigger teams face larger coordination costs, acting to
limit the desired degree of specialization.21
Next consider the choice of  and  that maximizes the discounted value of skilled services







Let ()=−,w h e r e captures the degree of coordination costs that ensue with greater
labor division. Let ()=(),w h e r e and  are educational technology parameters.
It follows from the above maximization problem that23
∗ =  (14)
∗ =  (15)





. Expertise at tasks declines with higher
discount rates (), which reduce the length of education, and with greater coordination
costs (), which limit specialization.
As a simple benchmark, assume common  around the world. Then the ratio of skilled












21For analytical convenience, we will let team size, , be a continuous variable.
22Decentralized actors may not necessarily achieve this symmetric, output maximizing outcome. In fact,
given the presence of complementarities across workers, multiple equilibria are possible (see Jones 2010).
Here we consider the output maximizing case as a useful benchmark.
23The following stationary points are unique, and it is straightforward to show that they satisfy the
conditions for a maximum.
24This model thus suggests a complementarity of mechanisms. Diﬀerences in the quality of
education (), discount rates (), and coordination penalties () have multiplicative eﬀects.
These interacting channels provide compounding means by which skilled labor services may
diﬀer substantially across economies.
4.2.3 Calibration Illustration
We focus on the division of labor. Note from (15) that with common  the equilibrium
diﬀerence in the division of labor (that is, the team size ratio) is equivalent to the inverse
coordination cost ratio, 

. To calibrate the model, let  =2 2, which follows if the
duration of schooling among the highly educated is 22 years and the discount rate is 01.
Further let  =1and take the Mincerian coeﬃcients as those used to calculate each
country’s human capital stocks throughout the paper, as described in the Appendix. Figure
4 then plots the implied variation in the division of labor, , that reconciles (16) with
the quality variation 
 
 implied by (12), under the assumption that rich countries have
no advantage in education technology.
We ﬁnd that a 4.3-fold diﬀerence in the division of labor can explain the productivity
diﬀerence between Israel and Kenya (the 85-15 percentile country comparison), and a 2.4-fold
diﬀerence explains the productivity diﬀerence between Korea and India (the 75-25 percentile
country comparison). The extreme case of the USA and the former Zaire is explained with a
22-fold diﬀerence. These diﬀerences would fall to the extent that the education technology
(,)i ss u p e r i o ri nr i c h e rc o u n t r i e s .
Are large division of labor diﬀerences reasonable? Systematic measures are not readily
available in the micro-literature and await further research, but the anecdotes above about
medical and engineering specialization do suggest very large diﬀerences, and specialized
training clearly raises skills at particular tasks by very large multiples. In any case, the
primary observation here is that considerations of task specialization face little theoretical
constraint in providing an interpretation for both (1) the large diﬀerences in skilled labor




This paper introduces a generalized framework for human capital accounting. Traditional
development accounting is nested as a special case and, under mild conditions, is shown to
provide only a lower bound on human capital variation across economies. A "generalized
division of labor" aggregator is introduced, which allows human capital stocks to be calcu-
lated with relatively little aggregation structure. This framework can reconcile the conﬂict
between regression analyses (e.g. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992) and traditional account-
ing approaches (e.g. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 1997, Hall and Jones 1999, Caselli 2005).
Human capital stocks can now play a central role in explaining the wealth and poverty of
nations.
Having established these results about human capital stocks, the paper further considers
possible underlying sources of human capital variation. First, the generalized framework
is extended to account for quality diﬀerences in workers’ service ﬂows. Wage variation is
found to be a poor guide to quality diﬀerences, because labor supply adjustments tend to
neutralize the wage eﬀects. In consequence, quality diﬀerences tend to appear as quantity
diﬀerences rather than wage diﬀerences. Because skilled labor quantity diﬀerences are so
large across countries, one infers correspondingly large diﬀerences in skilled labor qualities.
Second, variation in knowledge acquisition is incorporated into the accounting framework.
Increased specialization — allowing greater collective acquisition of knowledge — is seen to
amplify skilled service ﬂows, providing a candidate, underlying production theory for the
relatively large quality of skilled worker services in advanced economies.
5.2 Interpretations, Implications, and Extensions
The paper’s estimates of human capital stocks suggest that cross-country output variation
can now be accounted for without relying on residual, total factor productivity (TFP) vari-
ation. Because TFP is often interpreted as (i) "ideas" and/or (ii) "institutions", this paper
might therefore seem to diminish these explanations for economic development. Such an
implication, however, need not follow if (1) ideas are embodied in the capital inputs and (2)
the embodiment process is inﬂuenced by institutions. In this interpretation, the contribution
of this paper is not in reducing the roles of ideas or institutions, but in emphasizing human
26capital’s potential as a central feature of understanding productivity diﬀerences. This paper
closes by considering this perspective.
Consider ideas ﬁrst. Macroeconomic arguments aside, studies of actual production
processes through history suggest that the creation and diﬀusion of ideas are central to
understanding productivity.24 Yet one may also claim, by studying any particular pro-
duction process, that ideas enter production only when they are known and implemented;
that is, only when actuated through tangible inputs - the people and their physical inputs
that actually make things. In fact, the physical instantiation of an idea may be a good
description of what physical capital is (e.g. a microprocessor is a set of ideas etched on
silicon) and learning ideas may be a good description of education (e.g. skilled workers are
vessels of facts, theories, and techniques). In this view, one doesn’t need TFP for ideas to
be a centerpiece of economic development.
Putting ideas into production through capital inputs, rather than as a residual, also pro-
vides explicit processes in which institutions matter. As further emphasized by the division
of labor model, individuals may collectively fail to embody advanced ideas when faced, e.g.,
with high interest rates, high coordination costs, and poor educational institutions. Institu-
tional features like credit constraints, weak property rights and contracting environments,
and poor public good provision would then naturally underpin these investment failures.
Lastly, claiming that ideas enter production through people and their machines leads
quickly to an emphasis on the division of labor. If embodiment is needed for ideas to
become useful in production, then this next logical step follows to the extent that the set
of existing ideas is too large for any one person to know. Diﬀerentiated knowledge across
workers is then necessary to bring the collective set of advanced ideas into production (Jones
2009). Thus, while the division of labor calibration in Section 5 provides one approach, the
broader point is that successfully mapping an advanced economy’s ideas into productive
inputs naturally depends on specialized workers, which suggests that the division of labor
is a central aspect of understanding human capital and economic development. Jones
(2010) further develops this idea and suggests that, beyond cross-country income diﬀerences,
division of labor variation can explain a variety of stylized facts about the world economy.
24See, e.g., Mokyr’s The Lever of Riches (1992) for many historical examples. Nordhaus (1997) provides
a powerful example by studying the price of light through time. Conley and Udry (2010) is one of many
studies demonstrating that ideas can fail to diﬀuse in poor countries.
27In summary, the analysis in this paper suggests a substantially ampliﬁed role of human
capital. The ﬁndings oﬀer a reconciliation of regression and accounting approaches to human
capital measurement. More broadly, the ﬁndings are fully consistent with a framework in
which investment, ideas, and institutions play substantive roles — but where human capital
is drawn to the heart of economic development.
While the framework is applied here to cross-country income diﬀerences, the same frame-
work has other natural applications at the level of countries, regions, cities, or ﬁrms. Growth
accounting provides one direction for future work. The urban-rural economy literature is
another direction, where productivity diﬀerences from specialization are often suggested as
critical but cannot be captured using traditional human capital measures.
286A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Proof.  = (1 2) is constant returns in its inputs (Assumption 1). Therefore,
by Euler’s theorem for homogeneous functions, the true human capital aggregate can gener-
ically be written  =
P





Recalling that  = 
 (Assumption 2), so that 
1 = 
11, we can therefore write





P r o o fo fL e m m a2
Proof. If  = (1) is constant returns to scale, then 1 is homogeneous of degree
zero by Euler’s theorem. Therefore 1(1)=1(1 1).N o t i n g t h a t 11 ≤ 0,i t
follows that Λ = 
1 
1 ≥ 1 iﬀ 
1 ≥ 
1 .
P r o o fo fL e m m a3
Proof. By Lemma 1,  = 1 ˜ , providing an independent expression for  based
on its ﬁrst derivative. If the human capital aggregator can be manipulated into the
form  = (1(2)) = (1(1)),t h e nw eh a v ef r o mL e m m a1 =
1(1(1)) ˜ . This provides an implicit function determining  solely as a function
of 1 and ˜ ;t h a ti s ,w i t h o u tr e f e r e n c et o(2).
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. By Lemma 1,  = 1 ˜ . For the GDL aggregator, 1 =( 1)
1







P r o o fo fL e m m a4
Proof. Consider two skill categories that require  and  years of training respectively.
Holding these durations ﬁxed, imagine that the skill levels  and  associated with each
may vary. Assumptions 1 and 2 imply (3). Taking logs and diﬀerentiating, it follows that
1=
 ln()







. Under Assumption 5, arbitrage in career choices
(()=()) implies  = (−). Thus, if labor supply is endogenous, then the
29wage returns are pegged to the duration of training, not the skill associated with it. It then
follows that
 ln()
 ln() =0 . Hence the result.
Data Appendix
Capital Stocks
To minimize sources of diﬀerence with standard assessments, this paper uses the same
data in Caselli’s (2005) review of cross-country income accounting. Income per worker is
taken from the Penn World Tables v6.1 (Heston et al. 2002) and uses the 1996 benchmark
year. Capital per worker is calculated using the perpetual inventory method,  =  +
(1 − )−1, where the depreciation rate is set to  =0 06 and the initial capital stock is
estimated as 0 = 0( + ). Further details are given in Section 2.1 of Caselli (2005).
As a robustness check, I have also considered calculating capital stocks as the equilibrium
value under Assumptions 1 and 2 with a Cobb-Douglas aggregator; i.e.,  =( ) ,w h e r e
 =1 3 is the capital share and  =0 1. This alternative method provides similar results
as in the main paper.
To calculate human capital stocks, I use Barro and Lee (2001) for the labor supply
quantities for those at least 25 years of age, which are provided in ﬁve groups: no schooling,
some primary, completed primary, some secondary, completed secondary, some tertiary, and
completed tertiary. Schooling duration for primary and secondary workers are taken from
Caselli and Coleman (2006) and schooling duration for completed tertiary is assumed to be
4 years. Schooling duration for "some" education in a category is assumed to be half the
duration for complete education in that category.
For wage returns to schooling, I use Mincerian coeﬃcients from Psacharopoulos (1994)
as interpreted by Caselli (2005). Let  be the years of schooling and let relative wages be
()=(0). Psacharopoulos (1994) ﬁnds that wage returns per year of schooling are
higher in poorer countries, and Caselli summarizes these ﬁndings with the following rule.
Let  =0 13 for countries with ¯  ≤ 4,w h e r e¯  =( 1 )
P
=1  is the country’s average
years schooling. Meanwhile, let  =0 10 for countries with 4  ¯  ≤ 8,a n dl e t =0 07 for
the most educated countries with ¯ 8. Unskilled labor equivalents are then calculated as
˜ 1 =
P
=1  in each country.
30As a robustness check, I have considered calculating human capital stocks under a va-
riety of other assumptions. The results using the GDL aggregators are broadly robust to
reasonable alternative human capital input measures. The sample mean value of  at which
capital stocks fully explain income variation typically falls in the the [152] interval across
human capital accounting methods. For example, if we set  = 10 (the global average)
for all countries, then the gap between unskilled labor equivalents widens slightly, since the
returns to education in poor countries now appear lower and the returns in rich countries
appear higher. The resulting increase in human capital ratio means that capital inputs can
explain income diﬀerences at somewhat higher values of , but still with 2.
Variation in the Quality of Unskilled Labor






1 , where wages are for unskilled workers in the U.S. The term 
1 is the
mean wage for unskilled workers born in the US and 
|
1 is the mean wage for unskilled
workers born in a poor country and working in the US.
Wages are calculated from the 5% microsample of the 2000 U.S. Census (available from
www.ipums.org). Unskilled workers are deﬁned as employed individuals with 4 or less years
of primary education (individuals with educ=1 in the pums data set) who are between the
ages of 20 and 65. To facilitate comparisons, mean wages are calculated for individuals who
speak English well (individuals with speakeng=3, 4, or 5 in the pums data set).
Figure A2 presents the data, with the mean wage ratio, 
|
1 
1 , plotted against log
per-capita income of the source country. (National income data is taken from the Penn
World Tables v6.1.) There is one observation p e rs o u r c ec o u n t r y ,b u tt h es i z eo ft h em a r k e r
is scaled to the number of observed workers from that source country. The ﬁgure plots the
results net of ﬁxed eﬀects for gender and each integer age in the sample.




1 is calculated for ﬁve groups of immigrants based on quintiles of average
schooling duration in the source country. The age and gender controlled data is used,
although using the raw wage means produces similar ﬁndings. The corrections for 
1 
1
are then applied to the human capital stock in each country. These corrected data are used
(only) when Assumption 4 is relaxed — in Panel B of Table 2, Figure 2B, and columns (4)-(6)
31of Table 3. One can use other reasonable methods to calculate 
1 
|
1 and apply it to
the human capital measures, but in general the primary ﬁndings of the paper are robust to
such variations, because the implications of relaxing Assumption 3 tend to be much greater.
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Table 1:  Basic Data 

















P R Y Y /  
(Income)  90.9 16.9 6.3 
p R K K /  
(Capital stock) 
185.3 43.9 17.4 







1.70 1.33 1.15 
P R L L 1 1 /  
(Unskilled workers)  .09 .44 .52 
Income and capital stock measures are per worker.  Data sources and methods are further 




Table 2: Human Capital and Income:  Accounting Approach 
  Elasticity of Substitution 
Between Unskilled Labor, H1, and Skilled Aggregate, Z(H2,..,HN) 
  1 1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8  2.0   
Panel A: Relaxing Assumption 3 
H
R/ H
P    358 21.9 8.6  5.4 4.1 1.3 
    269 16.4 6.5  4.0 3.1  1 
Success    1050% 163%  88%  64%  54%  25% 
Panel B: Relaxing Assumptions 3 and 4 
H
R/ H
P    306 18.6 7.3  4.6 3.5 1.1 
    269 16.4 6.5  4.0 3.1  1 
Success    950% 147% 79%  58%  48%  23% 
This table compares Israel and Kenya, which represent the 85
th and 15
th percentile countries 
respectively ranked by income per worker.  H
R/ H
P is the ratio of human capital stocks.   is the ratio 
of H
R/ H
P at the indicated elasticity of substitution to H
R/ H
P for the infinite elasticity of substitution 
case.  Success is the consequent percentage of the income variation that is explained by variation in 
capital inputs.  Figure 2 summarizes accounting for a broader set of rich and poor countries and shows 




Table 3: Human Capital and Income:  Regression Approach 
  Dependent variable is  Y ˆ log  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
            
log(H
~
)  2.606**   2.049**  1.713**    1.467** 
  (0.212)    (0.293)  (0.143)  (0.141) 
log( 1 H )   -0.957**  -0.344*    -0.762**  -0.508** 
    (0.195)  (0.158)  (0.141)  (0.137) 
Observations  92 92  92  92  92  92 
R-squared  0.508 0.371  0.533  0.445  0.246  0.545 





[1.28-1.44]  --  1.48 
[1.34,1.83] 
1.64 
[1.50-1.87]  --  1.83 
[1.83-2.28] 
  (from 1 H )  --  1.70 
[1.50,2.17] 
2.94 




Specifications (1) – (3) maintain Assumption 4. Specifications (4) – (6) relax Assumption 4.   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust 95% confidence intervals in square brackets.   
* indicates p<0.05, ** indicates p<0.01
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Table 4: Human Capital Services by Educational Groups 
Panel A: Human capital services, grouping secondary and tertiary educated workers 
  Elasticity of Substitution 
Between Unskilled Labor, H1, and Skilled Aggregate, Z(H2,..,HN) 













    1101 98.6 29.5 14.3  0.79 
            
Panel B: Human capital services, secondary and tertiary educated workers treated separately 
  Elasticity of Substitution 
Between Secondary, H2, and Tertiary, H3, Human Capital Services 






















  284 130  100  88.0  81.4  59.6 
            
This table compares Israel and Kenya, which represent the 85
th and 15
th percentile countries 
respectively ranked by income per worker.  Panel A of this table corresponds to Panel A of 
Table 2.  Panel B considers the implied human capital services for secondary and tertiary 
educated workers, depending on the elasticity of substitution between their services.  In Panel 
B, the elasticity of substitution in the GDL aggregator is taken to be 1.6 – the mean value in 
Figure 2 – where capital variation across countries fully explains income differences. 
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Figure 2: Human Capital Stock Variation 
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Figure A2: Wage Ratios from 2000 US Census among Employed Unskilled Workers 
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